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Chapter 5

Mass Partisanship in Three Latin American Democracies[1]

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Is mass partisanship in Latin America similar to partisanship in older democracies with more entrenched party systems? Scholars of Latin American politics have been quick to adopt the concept of mass partisanship, which was first developed in the US context, as an analytic tool. But when an Argentine survey respondent self-designates as a partisan, does he or she mean the same thing as when a US respondent does the same? In this chapter, we explore several points of difference and similarity between partisanship in new and old democracies. We report and compare levels of partisanship across some of Latin America's new democracies and some of the developed world's older ones. We also report the individual-level correlates of partisanship's presence in our Latin American cases. More importantly, we consider whether self-declared partisanship is as enduring in Latin America as it is in developed-country contexts. The concept of mass partisanship originally connoted a lasting social identity that was forged in early adulthood, so a key test of its functional equivalence in very different settings is to see if individuals hold their self-declared partisanship for similar durations.

We compile results from cross-sectional and panel surveys conducted in three different Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico) and compare them to results from two different developed countries (UK and US). We find that rates of partisanship tend to be lower in the Latin American cases, although not dramatically so and not without some exceptions.

[1] We wish to thank the editors and Kenneth F. Greene for very useful comments on previous drafts.

Moreover, in all three Latin American cases, the less educated are more likely to be partisans than the well-educated, a correlation that is typically the reverse in older democracies. Finally, we find the individual-level stability of partisanship to be lower in Latin America than it is in the two developed countries. Within Latin America, entrenched programmatic parties have more stable partisans than do ideologically amorphous and new parties, but partisanship for even the most programmatic major parties in Latin America is more unstable than is that in the UK and the US. We conclude by arguing that, while partisanship is a useful concept in these young Latin American democracies, scholars should understand that it does mean something different—and particularly less enduring—than it does in the United States.

The Nature of Mass Partisanship

The formal academic conception of mass partisanship was largely hatched by the Michigan school scholars, who defined it as an enduring "affective orientation" toward a group (the party) object (Campbell et al. 1960: 121). In this "partisanship-as-identity" vein, the concept is akin to an arational social group identity that is forged in an individual by socialization agents during early adulthood (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002). Thereafter, partisanship is a political "anchor" that remains stable throughout the life cycle (Nadeau et al 2017). Once forged, it provides a persistent, biased lens through which individuals view the political world: politically colored information that affirms one's partisan beliefs is accepted, while that which runs counter is rejected (Zaller 1992).

In the wake of the Michigan studies, the concept of partisan identification was exported to European contexts, but it was met there with mixed success. Partisanship seemed to be less enduring than it was in the United States and, in some countries, even less stable than vote intention (Budge, Crewe, and Farlie 1976). Moreover, around this time, a revisionist school of

thought emerged on partisanship in the US that viewed it less as an enduring identity and more as a "running tally" of ongoing evaluations (Fiorina 1981). In this "partisanship-as-evaluation" view, partisan leanings do not filter but rather change with the evaluative information generated by political events.

Mass Partisanship in New Democracies

Which of these models, if either, better captures the nature of mass partisanship in new democracies? On the one hand, the partisanship-as-evaluation model seemingly fits most readily. The new democracies of the Third Wave (Huntington 1991) often featured nascent parties and party systems, so it was logical for scholars to assume that voters could not possibly possess stable identities that were rooted in early adulthood socialization and established party brands: "The psychological processes of self-categorization and group evaluation are … most apparent in established party systems, in which parties have cultivated symbols and group imagery" (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002: 13; see also Converse 1969). In a partisan *tabula rasa*, citizens can only learn a newfound partisan affiliation from observing party activity, candidate and incumbent behavior, and political and economic events (Brader and Tucker 2001; Samuels 2006; Smyth 2006). Similarly, where party platforms and brands are in flux, as has often been the case in new democracies (Stokes 2001), citizens with a longstanding affinity to a party may drop it as the group object mutates and loses its earlier form and intent (Lupu 2016b).

In Latin America, various studies and even casual observation show that party volatility is high (Roberts and Wibbels 1999). Major parties in Latin America have been known to break down (Morgan 2007, 2011), and outsider presidential candidates that form overnight parties as electoral vehicles have won elections with some frequency (e.g., Fernando Collor in Brazil,

Alberto Fujimori in Peru, and Jimmy Morales in Guatemala) (Roberts 2007). Similarly, election campaigns have a major impact in Latin America, as evidenced by sometimes massive swings in candidate fortunes in just a few months' time (Baker, Ames, and Rennó 2006; Greene 2011). Such high rates of flux in citizen preferences during and across campaigns seem to suggest that mass party sentiments, when present, are easily abandoned and thus more evaluation than identity.

On the other hand, scholarly portrayals of partisanship in new democracies as more socially grounded and stable do exist. Many countries never experienced ruptures in their party systems, even during authoritarian interludes (Lupu and Stokes 2010; Scully 1995), and others saw new party systems emerge that bore a striking resemblance to long-standing historical political configurations (Wittenberg 2006). Still others developed party systems that immediately took on a clear social group character. For example, party affiliations in many of Africa's new democracies quickly assumed an ethnic logic (Ferree 2006; Posner 2005).

For Latin America, there is a rich scholarly history—one that predates the current democratic era and the proliferation of survey research in the region—of referring to different parties' stable and often socially rooted constituencies (Collier and Collier 1991). References such as *peronista*, *petista*, and *priísta* betray an analytical view that some individuals hold enduring allegiances (Madsen and Snow 1991). Moreover, at least some partisan sympathies in the region appear to be forged via class and other identities (Mainwaring, Meneguello, and Power 2000).

In sum, the overriding question about the nature of partisanship in new democracies remains unresolved. To be sure, the partisanship-as-identity versus partisanship-as-evaluation debate undoubtedly poses a false dichotomy: any political system surely has some blind partisans

with rigid identities and other more ambivalent partisans who shift with the political winds (Baker et al. 2016; Lavine, Johnston, and Steenbergen 2012). But this recognition does not get us very far. In this chapter, we seek to shed more light on the prevalence of individual-level partisan stability and change in different systems.

The Need to Understand Individual-Level Stability

Most attempts to assess the nature of mass partisanship in Latin America have relied on cross-sectional survey data (Nadeau et al 2017), and these analyses have yielded different insights that are, collectively, somewhat internally contradictory. For example, self-declared partisans in Latin America are, relative to nonpartisans, more participatory, more politically knowledgeable, more ideologically extreme, and more likely to vote for the same party at multiple times and levels (Lupu 2015). Partisanship is also highly correlated with vote choice (Carlin, Singer, and Zechmeister 2015: 350; Nadeau et al 2017). These findings lead Noam Lupu to conclude that "… mass partisanship in the developing world functions much like it does in advanced democracies" (Lupu 2015: 227). In contrast, findings from rolling cross-sections in Latin America show macropartisanship to be less stable and nonpartisans to be more numerous than in developed democracies (Samuels 2006). We revisit and retest some of these cross-sectional findings in this chapter.

Although valuable, the literature's cross-sectional findings skirt the most important issue in assessing the nature of mass partisanship. As should be clear from the description above, competing expectations about the degree of individual-level temporal persistence in partisan and nonpartisan sentiment lie at the root of the differences between the two schools of thought on mass partisanship. A fair test of the two thus seemingly calls for repeated observations of the

same individual through time; however, analyses of partisanship in Latin America using survey panel data have been rare. Our primary focus in this paper is to report rates of stability and change in partisan identities in Latin America at the individual level, and to show the extent to which these differ from those observed in developed countries.

Broadly speaking, mass partisanship can follow three intertemporal patterns. The partisanship-as-identity school's ideal type is a stable partisan—a person who expresses an equivalent partisan leaning in repeated interviews. At the opposite extreme, and more in line with the partisanship-as-evaluation school of thought, is the unstable or inconsistent partisan—a person who changes her or his declared partisanship from one party to another with some frequency. A third and intermediary pattern that has been well-documented in developed countries is the bounded partisan. Through time, bounded partisans switch between nonpartisanship and partisanship—but when declaring as partisans, they always do so for the same party. In other words, they are unstable, but they never cross party lines (Zuckerman, Dasović, and Fitzgerald 2007).[2]

Taken alone, the presence of bounded partisanship provides ambiguous evidence to adjudicate between the two schools of thought. On the one hand, although their instability is not quite in line with the Michigan school's enduring partisan ideal type, bounded partisans do betray a certain party loyalty by only ever choosing one party (even if sporadically) and avoiding all others. Moreover, some of this movement may be mere measurement error, with stable partisan leanings existing beneath noisy questionnaire-based measures (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002; Klar and Krupnikov 2016). On the other hand, the observed movements inherent to bounded partisanship may be responses to environmental stimuli, such as political events

[2] A fourth pattern is stable nonpartisanship, but we leave this pattern aside in this chapter since it is not partisanship per se.

(Franklin and Jackson 1983) or social-network influences (Fitzgerald 2011; Zuckerman, Dasović, and Fitzgerald 2007). These more purposeful movements are more indicative of partisanship-as-evaluation.

Resolving all of these ambiguities is beyond the scope of this paper, and indeed some argue that they are irresolvable because of the difficulties in distinguishing signal from measurement noise (DeVellis 2016; Jackson and Kollman 2011). Our primary goal is to identify the relative prevalence of these three intertemporal patterns, although we would point interested readers to the small number of previous studies that have explored in greater detail the roots of individual-level partisan change in Latin America (see Baker et al. 2016; McCann and Lawson 2003).

Cases

We conduct various analyses of survey data from Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, and we present data from the UK and US to provide points of comparison from established democracies. Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico are Latin America's three largest countries and three of the world's largest new democracies, but our reasons for focusing on them are more practical: political scientists have conducted at least one high-quality panel study in each of these countries. Fortunately, there are further methodological advantages to looking at these three because their party systems feature useful differences on several relevant dimensions (Carlin, Singer, and Zechmeister 2015: 15).

On most measures, Mexico's party system is the most institutionalized and the least fragmented. Mexico has three major parties—*Partido Acción Nacional* (National Action Party—PAN), *Partido Revolucionario Institucional* (Institutional Revolutionary Party—PRI) and

Partido de la Revolución Democrática (Party of the Democratic Revolution—PRD) that are more programmatic than the Latin American average (Kitschelt et al. 2010: 320). Two of its parties (PAN and PRI) are nearly a century old, and all three have collectively dominated political competition since the PRD's advent in 1989. That said, a new leftist party, *Movimiento Regeneración Nacional* (National Regeneration Movement—MORENA), emerged from a split with the PRD in 2014. The three major parties have held relatively consistent brands in recent years. Not since the PRI's adoption of free-market policies (long-favored by the PAN) in the 1980s, after decades of pursuing statist policies, have there been any major brand changes.

Brazil's system is more fragmented, with usually more than 25 total and 8 effective legislative parties. Of its major parties, only the leftist *Partido dos Trabalhadores* (Workers' Party—PT) has a programmatic and ideological basis, although even this has been diluted by policy moderation in recent years (Hunter 2010). Most remaining major parties are nominally centrist or rightist, but they are driven more by clientelistic, pork-barreling and patronage concerns than by ideology. Regional fragmentation is also severe. With the exception of the dramatically transformed (not to mention renamed and trimmed) *Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro* (Brazilian Democratic Movement Party—PMDB), all of Brazil's major parties were born during or after the closing years of the military dictatorship (1964-1985).

Argentina's party system is harder to characterize. It is dominated by the Peronist *Partido Justicialista* (Justicialist Party—PJ), which dates, as its name would suggest, back to the mid-20th century. Although founded as a populist vehicle with strong roots in the industrial working class, the PJ has undergone major brand change (Lupu 2016b; Stokes 2001) and factionalization since democratization, and today it is a highly diverse ideological entity. In recent years, the largest and most important faction has been the left-leaning Kirchnerist *Frente para la Victoria*

(Front for Victory—FPV), but the center-right *Frente Renovador* (Renewal Front) faction, formed in 2013, has ideological roots in Carlos Menem's pro-market governance. The set of viable opponents to the PJ has been highly unstable, and in the 2015 election the FPV's main challenger (and eventual winner) at the presidential level was a center-right party, *Propuesta Republicana* (Republican Proposal—PRO), that was a mere 10 years old (Murillo and Levitsky, this volume).

Cross-Sectional Findings

Are partisans less prevalent in newer democracies than in older ones? If partisanship is an identity forged in young adulthood, then it may take a generation of party system entrenchment for aggregate rates of partisanship to reach those of older democracies (Converse 1969). Moreover, even after a generation or more of democracy, not all three party systems in our Latin American cases are entrenched. Mexico's may be the closest to institutionalization—ironic given its status as the youngest democracy of the three. However, the other two, especially Argentina, have featured substantial flux in partisan options and brands. Party system and regime age are not coterminous.

Figure 5.1 reports the share of respondents in our five countries that are self-declared partisans. To facilitate this cross-national and cross-regional comparison, we attempt to hold survey question wording constant across our cases; differences in question wordings can yield up to 25-point swings in the estimated share of partisans (Baker and Rennó 2016). We consulted the most recent available CSES wave for each country, which asks respondents if they feel "closer to one party." Figure 5.1 reports the percentages saying "yes" (partisans) and "no" (nonpartisans) in

each country. For Argentina we report results from APES 2015, which uses a similar question structure and wording ("do you feel more sympathy for one political party…?") to the CSES.[3]

Figure 5.1: Rates of Partisanship in Five Democracies



Source: APES 2015, wave 1; CSES 2005 (UK); CSES 2012 (Mexico, US); CSES 2014 (Brazil).

Four of the five countries line up nicely in support of the age-of-party-system argument. The three youngest party systems—Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico—have a lower number of partisans than the country with the oldest continuous party system, the United States. They also line up correctly relative to one another: Brazil has the youngest party system (27 percent partisan) followed by Argentina (39 percent) and then Mexico (45 percent). Overall, older parties and party systems seem to enhance mass partisanship. The one exception to this is the UK, where rates of partisanship fall in between those of Brazil and Argentina.

When citizens in these new democracies self-categorize as partisans, do they mean the same thing as do citizens in older democracies? One way of answering this question is to see if

[3] Analyses reported in Baker and Renno (2016) show that, due to question wording effects, these are almost certainly underestimates of the rates of partisanship. (See also Keith et al 1992.) The degree of underestimation, however, is (at about 25 percentage points) roughly constant across countries. Again, we choose these wordings to provide cross-national comparability.

the correlates of the presence of partisanship are the same in the two sets of contexts (Lupu 2015). In the US, individuals of high socioeconomic status (SES) and high political knowledge are more likely to be partisan, and younger citizens are less likely to be partisan. Figure 5.2 reports the correlates of individual-level partisanship in our three Latin American countries by showing coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from three probit regressions—one for each country. The dependent variable in each is a binary measure of whether the respondent is a self-declared partisan (=1) or not (=0). We control for two measures of SES (education and wealth), age, political awareness, and gender. These data are from three different survey projects with different wordings, so we convert the independent variables (except for gender) to percentiles in order to facilitate cross-national comparison. For example, each respondent's value on education is her or his percentile score (relative to their compatriots in the national sample) on education.

Figure 5.2: Correlates of Partisanship in Three New Democracies: Results from Three Probit Models



Note: Dependent variable is partisan (=1) and nonpartisan (=0). There is one model per country. Markers are probit coefficients and lines sweep out 95% confidence intervals. *Sources:* APES 2015, wave 1 (N=1,121); BEPS 2014, wave 1 (N=3,013); Mexico 2012 Panel Study, wave 1 (N=1,327).

The three countries show a surprising similarity to one another. On all variables, the direction of influence is the same in all three countries (with the exception of gender in Mexico). Political awareness is an important, positive correlate of partisanship, as it is in the US. Partisanship also becomes more prevalent with age, although this relationship is not statistically significant in Argentina. Perhaps the one finding that stands out the most is that SES is a *negative* correlate of partisanship in all three countries. Either education or wealth is statistically significant and negatively signed in all three countries. Unlike in the US, partisanship in these three new democracies is the redoubt of the economically marginalized, although it is also the redoubt of the politically aware among them.

This negative correlation is probably a function of partisan competition and cleavage structure at the country level. In Argentina and Brazil, left-of-center factions or parties (the FPV and PT, respectively) with core constituencies among the poor tend to have more declared partisans than their centrist and rightist competitors (Samuels 2006). In Mexico the right- and middle-class-leaning PAN performed poorly in 2012, creating some shame around expressing support for it (Klar and Krupnikov 2016). All three patterns could induce this negative correlation.[4]

Individual-Level Stability

These cross-sectional findings are useful for identifying how rates of macropartisanship differ between new and old democracies as well as how the correlates of micropartisanship overlap and differ between the two contexts. But the heart of the theoretical matter hinges on

[4] This negative correlation contradicts Lupu's (2015) finding that education is a positive correlate of partisanship across 18 Latin American countries. However, our analysis is different in that we look at just three countries, whereas Lupu estimates a single net effect across 18 countries. Also, Lupu finds the substantive effect of education to be statistically significant but small.

stability within individuals through time, so we focus on this at greater length. To quantify the stability of mass partisanship in Latin America, we analyze several academic panel studies of electoral behavior from our three Latin American countries. These panel studies are listed in Table 5.1. The panels range from two-wave to six-wave studies. Most contain near-nationally-representative samples of respondents, although the longest panel contains respondents from just two mid-sized cities (Caxias do Sul and Juiz de Fora) in Brazil. All were conducted in conjunction with federal elections that featured contests for the presidency and (part or all of) both chambers of the national legislature.

Table 5.1: Electoral Behavior Panel Studies of Latin America

Panel Study	**Event**	**Years in which interviews occurred**	**Number of waves**	**Source**
2015 Argentine Panel Election Study	Federal elections, 2015	2015	2	Lupu et al. 2015
Two-City Brazil Panel Study, 2002-2006	Federal elections, 2002 and 2006	2002, 2004, 2006	6(5)[†]	Baker, Ames, and Rennó 2006
Brazilian Electoral Panel Study, 2010	Federal elections, 2010	2010	3	Ames et al. 2013
Brazilian Electoral Panel Study, 2014	Federal elections 2014	2014	7(5)[*]	Ames et al. 2016
Mexico 2000 Panel Study	Federal elections 2000	2000	4	Lawson 2001[5]
Mexico 2006	Federal elections	2005, 2006	3	Lawson 2007[6]

[5] Senior Project Personnel for the Mexico 2000 Panel Study include (in alphabetical order): Miguel Basáñez, Roderic Camp, Wayne Cornelius, Jorge Domínguez, Frederico Estévez, Joseph Klesner, Chappell Lawson (Principal Investigator), Beatriz Magaloni, James McCann, Alejandro Moreno, Pablo Parás and Alejandro Poiré. Funding for the study was provided by the National Science Foundation (SES-0517971) and *Reforma* newspaper; fieldwork was conducted by *Reforma* newspaper's Polling and Research Team, under the direction of Alejandro Moreno

[6] Senior Project Personnel for the Mexico 2006 Panel Study include (in alphabetical order): Andy Baker, Kathleen Bruhn, Roderic Camp, Wayne Cornelius, Jorge Domínguez, Kenneth Greene, Chappell Lawson (Principal Investigator), Beatriz Magaloni, James McCann, Alejandro Moreno, Alejandro Poiré, and David Shirk. Funding for the study was provided by the National Science Foundation (SES-517971) and *Reforma* newspaper; fieldwork was conducted by *Reforma* newspaper's Polling and Research Team, under the direction of Alejandro Moreno.

Panel Study	2006			
Mexico 2012	Federal elections	2012	2	Lawson 2013[7]
Panel Study	2012			

[†] In the Two-city Brazil Panel Study, six waves of interviewing occurred but the partisanship question was asked in only five of them.
[*] In the Brazilian Electoral Panel Study 2014, seven waves of interviewing occurred, but four were split waves that sought re-interviews with only half the sample. Thus, interviewees responded at most five times.

We use all of these panels to calculate three percentages for any given party and pair of panel waves. The first percentage captures *stable partisans*: the share of declared partisans of a given party in the earlier wave who remain partisans of that same party in the later wave. For example, if half of wave 1 *petistas* declare themselves to be *petistas* in wave 2, then the figure for the PT for this 1→2 pairing is 50%. The second percentage is *defected nonpartisans*: the share of declared partisans of a given party in the earlier wave who declare as nonpartisans in the later wave. For example, if two-fifths of wave 1 *petistas* declare themselves to be nonpartisans in wave 2, then the figure for the PT for this 1→2 pairing is 40%. The third percentage is *defected partisans*: the share of declared partisans of a given party in the earlier wave who declare as partisans of another party in the later wave. For example, if one-tenth of wave 1 *petistas* declare themselves to be partisans of a non-PT party in wave 2, then the figure for the PT for this 1→2 pairing is 10%. This third percentage is simply the complement of the sum of the other two. These three loosely correspond to the three intertemporal patterns described above: the stable partisan, the bounded partisan, and the unstable partisan, respectively.[8]

Our unit of analysis is, after aggregating up from the individual level, the wave dyad. To maximize information, we calculate our set of percentages between every possible panel wave

[7] Senior Project Personnel for the Mexico 2012 Panel Study include (in alphabetical order): Jorge Domínguez, Kenneth Greene, Chappell Lawson, and Alejandro Moreno. Funding for the study was provided by the *Centro de Estudios Sociales y de Opinión Pública de la Cámara de Diputados* (CESOP) and the *Secretaría de Gobernación*; fieldwork was conducted by *DATA OPM*, under the direction of Pablo Parás.
[8] The minor conceptual difference is that our labeling of empirical patterns here refers to patterns of change and continuity in dyadic wave pairings, whereas the intertemporal patterns pointed in the theoretical discussion above refer to patterns over an indefinite time period.

dyad. For example, a four-wave panel offers not just the consecutive 1→2, 2→3, and 3→4 dyads but also the 1→3, 2→4, and 1→4 dyads. As directioned dyads, the number of useful dyads is $N(N\text{-}1)/2$, where N is the number of waves. That said, we do not use or report any percentages that are based on a subsample of less than 30 respondents (i.e., the earlier wave's partisans number less than 30).[9]

We report the results graphically in Figures 5.3 through 5.7. The figures use a common presentational scheme to convey dynamics in mass partisanship for the two (Argentina and the US) or three (Brazil, Mexico, and UK) largest parties as a function of time (in months) between panel interviews.[10] By way of example, consider Figure 5.3, which presents results from the 1980 American National Election Study (ANES). Figure 5.3 plots four lines. The two thick lines are lowess-estimated curves of the percentage of stable partisans, with one thick line for each of the major parties: Democrats (sold black line) and Republicans (dashed gray line). The scatterplot points used to construct these two thick lines are shown as single letters that denote party. The thin lines above the thick lines denote the lowess-estimated *cumulative* percentage of defected nonpartisans—that is, the percentage of defected partisans plus the percentage of stable partisans. (The scatterplot points for these lines are not shown to reduce clutter.) Thus, the vertical gap between a thick and thin line of the same shading and pattern captures the estimated percentage of defected nonpartisans for that party. Finally, the vertical gap between a thin line and the 100% line captures the lowess-estimated percentage of defected partisans for the denoted party.

[9] This occurs with some frequency for PMDB and *Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira* (Brazilian Social Democracy Party—PSDB) partisans in the Brazil panel studies.

[10] Percentages in the Latin American cases are calculated using weights to adjust for panel attrition (Vandecasteele and Debels 2007). This technique weights the observed cases by their probability of dropout, upweighting observed respondents who share sociodemographic characteristics with respondents who dropped out.

Figure 5.3: Individual-level Stability in Mass Partisanship in the United States: Evidence from a Panel Study



Source: American National Election Study 1980.
Note: Lines are lowess curves. The placement of the letter markers denotes the percentage of respondents with stable partisanship for each available dyad; these are the points used to construct the thick lowess curves. (Points used to construct the thin lowess curves are not shown.)

To summarize, thick lines show percentages of stable partisans, and thin lines denote percentages of stable partisans plus defected nonpartisans. The latter are relevant since they convey the shares of individuals who have not crossed party lines—that is, those who are consistent with the bounded partisanship pattern. The remaining portions—the vertical distances above the thin lines—are the percentages of defected partisans. They are unequivocally unstable in crossing party lines.

Developed-Country Comparisons

The 1980 ANES is useful because it contains as many as four interviews and reinterviews with respondents.[11] Figure 5.3 shows partisan stability to be high in the US: about 80% to 85% of respondents maintain their partisanship in repeated interviews, and these rates do not fall over the course of the 10 observed months.[12] Moreover, partisan switching is exceedingly rare, providing evidence of a strong partisan boundedness. Of those who defect from their earlier partisanship, 80% do so to independence. In any given wave, only about 4% of *t*-1 partisans defect to the other party.

Figure 5.4 performs a similar exercise on a sample of UK respondents, showing rates of partisan stability for the two major parties to be equally high. We use the British Household Panel Study from 1991 to 2009, during which re-interviews occurred on an annual basis. This presents a variety of possible dyad lengths, but we limit the analysis to all dyads of 4 years or less, as this is (roughly) the maximum dyad length we have for a Latin American country. Among adherents of each of the two major parties (the Conservative ("Tory") Party and the Labour Party), about 80% maintain their same partisan designation over one year's time, and, strikingly, 75% maintain it over four years' time. As in the US, most of those who exhibit some instability do so in a bounded way, switching to independence but not to a competing party. Less than 5% of major party supporters switch to another party after one year, and less than 7% do so over the course of four years. Expressed adherents of the third party are somewhat less stable than this. After a year and four years, 65% and 57% (respectively) of Liberal Democrats remained Liberal Democrats.

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[11] The 1980 ANES panel did not have clearly delineated waves since there were, in essence, three different sets of panel respondents, each entering at separate times and each asked to interview a different number of times. Figure 5.3 thus refers to, on the *x*-axis, "months between interviews" and calculates entries as such. This provides a more even distribution of entries along the x-axis.

[12] At the individual level, the average tau-b rank-order correlation between partisanship in paired waves is .78, which is similar to the .71 found by Converse (1964) over a longer time gap—from 1958 to 1960 in ANES data. This suggests that relatively little aggregate change in rates of stability occurred in the US over these two decades.

Recall from Figure 5.1 that the UK has a surprisingly low number of partisans. What that finding disguised is the UK's high stability of partisanship and the churn of bounded partisanship: in any given cross-section, many nonpartisans have expressed a partisan sentiment for just one party in the past. As a final example, previous research on Germany shows similarly high rates of stability and partisan boundedness. In a seventeen-wave panel study of Germans, an average of 78% of Social Democrats and 76% of Christian Democrats showed stability over the one-year gaps between interviews (Zuckerman, Dasović, and Fitzgerald 2007, 41). We conclude that mass partisanship in these stablished democracies has a medium-high degree of temporal persistence, and most defectors turn to nonpartisanship rather than switching across partisan lines.

Figure 5.4: Individual-level Stability in Mass Partisanship in the United Kingdom: Evidence from a Panel Study



Source: British Household Panel Survey 1991-2009.
Note: Lines are lowess curves. The placement of the letter markers denotes the percentage of respondents with stable partisanship for each available dyad; these are the points used to construct the thick lowess curves. (Points used to construct the thin lowess curves are not shown.)

Brazil

How do rates of stability in Latin America compare to those in developed countries? Figure 5.5 presents results from three different panel studies conducted in Brazil.[13] The figure is divided into two frames. Frame A of Figure 5.5 shows results only for the available panel wave pairings that occurred less than one year apart. This provides comparability with the results presented for the U.S. and the other two Latin American countries (in Figures 5.6 and 5.7), as Argentina and Mexico have not had panel studies spanning more than one year. Frame B of Figure 5.5 shows the results for the full set of wave dyads, including those that span more than one year.

Although the parties are different, the thick lines and the thin lines signify the same concepts they signified in Figures 5.3 and 5.4. In both frames, the three thick lines are lowess-estimated curves of the percentage of stable partisans, with one line for each of the three largest parties: PT (solid black), PMDB (dashed gray), and PSDB (dotted black). (Adherents of the PT are called *petistas,* those of the PMDB are called *pemedebistas,* and those of the PSDB are called *tucanos*.) The thin lines above the thick lines denote the lowess-estimated *cumulative* percentage of defected nonpartisans, and the vertical gap between a thin line and the 100% line captures the lowess-estimated percentage of defected partisans for the denoted party.

[13] For this analysis, we treat each city in the two-city study as a separate panel, so in essence we make use of four panels, not three.

Figure 5.5: Individual-level Stability in Mass Partisanship in Brazil: Evidence from Three Panel Studies

Frame A: Only wave dyads separated by less than a year



Frame B: All available wave dyads



Source: Two-City Brazilian Panel Study, 2002-2006; BEPS 2010; BEPS 2014.
Note: Lines are lowess curves. The points used to construct the lowess curves are not shown to reduce clutter.

Frame A of Figure 5.5 contains three sets of interesting findings. First, declarations of partisanship in Brazil are more unstable than those in developed countries. The lowess curve estimates that just 75% of *petistas* re-declare themselves to be *petistas* over the space of two weeks to two months. Over five months, this figure falls to nearly 50%.[14] Rates of stability are even lower and tail off more quickly for the two non-leftist parties. The percentage of self-declared *pemedebistas* and *tucanos* who re-declare as such over the course of a mere one to two months is in the 60s. These figures shrink further over half a year, settling around 40% after just seven months.

Second, among *petistas*, this instability has a familiar pattern: bounded partisanship. A good deal of churn between *petismo* and independence occurs, but rarely does a declared *petista* later switch to partisanship for another party. Of those declared *petistas* who defect in some later panel wave, a large majority (an average of 86%) decamp to nonpartisanship (Samuels and Zucco 2015). This is evidenced by the large vertical gap (i.e., the percentage of defected nonpartisans) between the thick black solid line and the thin black solid line. The adoption of a new partisan sympathy after declaring *petismo* is rare, as evidenced by the small vertical gap (i.e., the percentage of switching partisans) between the thin black solid line and the 100% line. More precisely, a person who declares himself or herself to be a *petista* at any given time has, on average, a less than 6% chance of sympathizing with another party at a later date.

Third, and by contrast, switches to another party from the PMDB and from the PSDB is relatively common. The PMDB and the PSDB are less programmatic than the PT. Correspondingly, mass partisanship for these two entities features not only lower rates of

[14] An uptick in stability (back to about 75%) does occur at the seven-month mark. However, frame B suggests this is an ephemeral result of election timing, as these points correspond to wave 1→election wave dyads. In Brazil, declared partisanship for an election winner increases in the few weeks after election day (Michelitch 2015; Pereira 2014).

partisan stability but also weaker patterns of bounded partisanship. This is evidenced by the large vertical gap between the thin dashed line and the 100% line as well as the gap between the thin dotted line and the 100% line.[15] For example, of the 57% of respondents who defected from the PSDB over the course of seven months in 2010, half are defected partisans (i.e., they switched to another party). Similarly, of the 65% of respondents who defected from the PMDB over the same period in 2010, 46% of these switched to another party.

Frame B of Figure 5.5 uses all of the available dyads from Brazil, including those spanning more than a year. Readers should keep in mind, however, that the new long-span dyads are based on the two-city sample only. The figure has a few takeaways that are not in evidence in frame A. For rates of stability, the figure suggests the presence of party-specific asymptotes between 25% and 45% that are reached rather quickly—after perhaps a mere seven months. All three solid lines show a relatively steep fall within the first 7 months and then a leveling out (for the PMDB) or a slowdown in the rate of decline (for the PT and PSDB[16]). The PT appears to have a similar asymptote as that of the PMDB, although the rate of stability for the former is surely lower than it otherwise would be because the PT underwent a much more dramatic process of brand change between 2002 and 2006 than did the PMDB (Hunter 2010). The thin lines show an even clearer tendency to reach their asymptote already within the first half-year, meaning that defections to a competing party do not become more likely at 55 months than they are at 8 months. In sum, the rates of stability and instability that prevail just after half a year has passed also prevail after four years have passed.

[15] The exception that proves the rule is that rates of stability are higher among *pemedebistas* in Caxias, where the party is more right-leaning and programmatic than its national norm. (This is not apparent in Figure 5.5, but see Baker et al. 2016 for details.)

[16] Note that the line for the PSDB beyond a time period of 25 months is based on a single datum in one city.

Mexico

Figure 5.6 shows the results from the three different Mexican panel studies. The three parties are PRI (solid black lines), PAN (dashed grey lines), and PRD (dotted black lines). (Adherents of the PRI are called *priístas,* those of the PAN are called *panistas,* and those of the PRD are called *perredistas*.) The dynamics of mass partisanship in Mexico are different from those in Brazil, as we would expect given the different party system contexts. On balance, partisanship is more stable in Mexico than in Brazil. Moreover, there is more uniformity across parties and across time. The lowess-estimated rates of partisan stability (thick lines) range between 65% to 78% for *panismo*, 56% to 76% for *priísmo*, and 60% and 72% for *perredismo*. In other words, all three of Mexico's parties are similar to Brazil's most programmatic party, the PT, when it comes to rates of partisan stability. Furthermore, rates of partisan stability do not tail off sharply in Mexico as they do in Brazil. With respect to time, the rate of stability falls slightly for *panistas* and *priístas*, and not at all for *perredistas*.

Figure 5.6: Individual-level Stability in Mass Partisanship in Mexico: Evidence from Three Panel Studies



Source: Mexico Panel Studies 2000, 2006, 2012.
Note: Lines are lowess curves. The placement of the letter markers denotes the percentage of respondents with stable partisanship for each available wave pairing; these are the points used to construct the thick lowess curves. (Points used to construct the thin lowess curves are not shown.)

Still, the dynamics of Mexican partisanship do not look quite like those in developed democracies. Mexican partisanship is more unstable. The rate of stability after one month is only 70% to 75%. Moreover, defections to another party are more common—even more so than they are among former *petistas* in Brazil. Recall that in Brazil, *petistas* were more than 90% likely to either remain *petistas* or defect to independence in subsequent waves. In Mexico, the corresponding percentages for each party are in the 70s and 80s, despite its higher rates of partisan stability. The discrepancy is driven by the fact that Mexicans are more apt, when defecting from a party, to subsequently declare themselves to be partisans of a competitor. On average, about 48% of defectors switch and the other 52% defect to nonpartisanship (compared,

recall, to 86% among former *petistas*). Mexicans are not quite the bounded partisans that *petistas* and former *petistas* are in Brazil or that developed-democracy citizens are.

There are, perhaps, substantive reason for why switching across partisan lines is more common in Mexico. In recent decades, the PRI and the PAN have been relatively close ideological substitutes of one another, since the PRI adopted and implemented liberal economic policies in the 1980s and 1990s. Moreover, in 2000 many PRD leaners voted strategically for the PAN to oust the PRI (Greene 2007). These and other patterns at the elite level potentially blur lines of partisanship and support among otherwise competing parties. But it may just be a methodological artifact: The Brazilian wording is much more inviting of nonpartisan responses, whereas the Mexican wording discourages them (Baker and Rennó 2016). This would incline results toward showing more bounded partisanship in the former than the latter.

Argentina

Figure 5.7 shows results from the 2015 Argentine panel study, which offers a single panel wave dyad. Only two parties had a critical mass of partisans in the survey: the PRO of presidential winner Mauricio Macri and the Peronist (PJ) challenger Daniel Scioli.[17] The questionnaire did, however, separately code responses for the PJ and the FPV, the Kirchnerist faction of the PJ. (Party options were not explicitly read to respondents.) Given ambiguity as to which is the better way to proceed, we present results that (1) use an inclusive definition of PJ partisanship, tallying both types of responses as PJ partisans, and that (2) use the restrictive definition, tallying *peronismo* and FPV responses as separate parties. In other words, with the inclusive definition, a switch from (say) *peronismo* to FPV partisanship is *not* considered a

[17] Despite its age, the survey only identified 33 UCR supporters in the first wave, and just 21 of these participated in the second wave.

change in partisanship, whereas the restrictive definition does consider this as a change. Thus, the inclusive definition, by sheer force of math, inclines citizens to seem more stable in their partisanship than does the restrictive definition. Our inclination is to prefer the inclusive definition. FPV is a subset of the PJ, so it seems inaccurate to consider the two to be distinct political group objects, and many citizens surely consider "*peronismo*" to be something of a synonym for FPV partisanship. Moreover, treating them separately creates an asymmetry since *Frente Renovador* (the other main PJ faction) responses were not recorded separately.[18] Nonetheless, we report percentages based on both coding decisions.

With just one dyad, there is no lowess line to estimate, so Figure 5.7 simply shows the cumulative percentages of partisan stability and defection to nonpartisanship by party. The two percentages based on the inclusive definition are shown with diamonds in Figure 5.7, while the two percentages based on the restrictive definition are shown with circles in Figure 5.7.

[18] APES did separately record responses of *Frente UNA* (N=18 in wave 1), which was headed by *Frente Renovador* politician (and third-place finisher) Sergio Massa. But this was an ephemeral, multiparty coalition.

Figure 5.7: Individual-level Stability in Mass Partisanship in Argentina: Evidence from the 2015 Panel Study



Source: APES 2015

The PJ is one of Latin America's most storied, stable, and socially embedded parties while also being one of its most ideologically diverse and factionalized. What is the net effect of these countervailing trends on the stability of mass *peronismo*? Figure 5.7 reveals the stability to be moderate relative to that observed in Brazil and Mexico. At 54% (using the inclusive definition) after a period of 5 months, the stability of *peronismo* is a bit below that of *petismo*, below that of identity with Mexico's three parties, and above that of identity with Brazil's non-leftist parties. As with *petismo*, the dynamics of *peronismo* are highly bounded. The vast majority (82%) of defectors from PJ partisanship move to nonpartisanship; only 18% switch to another party. All told, fully 92% of wave 1 Peronist identifiers either remained Peronist identifiers or decamped to independence by wave 2. With this information and definition, we conclude that the overall dynamics of mass *peronismo* are similar to those underlying *petismo*.

(As expected, rates of stability are lower when using the restrictive definition. Thirty-nine percent of wave 1 FPV identifiers repeated their FPV identity in wave 2.) That said, the fact that we have only one pair of waves and that the pairing spans the idiosyncratic events of an election and a campaign (see Calvo, this volume) means that this conclusion about *peronismo* is necessarily tentative.

By contrast, PRO partisanship shows up as being the least stable of all eight Latin American parties we analyze. PRO is the youngest party of our eight,[19] although it does have a relatively clear ideological brand on the center right of Argentina's political spectrum. After five months, just 21% of PRO partisans re-declared as such, a number that is a good deal smaller than those for the PMDB and the PSDB in Brazil. Most of those who defected from PRO did so to independence (79%), however, so PRO partisanship is more bounded than that for Brazil's less ideological parties. Of course, this low level of stability did not prevent PRO candidate Macri from winning the election, something that itself contrasts Argentina from the advanced democracies, where executive victories by party outsiders are relatively rare.

Summary

What descriptive and causal summary conclusions can we draw about partisanship in Latin America from these analyses of individual-level stability? Perhaps the most important is that party characteristics matter.[20] A clear, programmatic and ideological party brand breeds individual-level stability (Lupu 2016b; Rahn 1993). This is most evident in Brazil, where partisanship for the PT is more stable and more bounded than is partisanship for the PMDB and

[19] PRO was founded as an electoral alliance in 2005 and registered as a party in 2010.
[20] Because the number of parties we consider in our Latin American cases is small (eight), we assess the effect of party-level traits qualitatively.

the PSDB. Mass partisanship for all three Mexican parties, which have had relatively stable ideological brands for at least three decades, is more stable than it is for these latter two parties in Brazil (McCann and Lawson 2003). Similarly, mass *peronismo*, meaning partisanship for Argentina's factionally riddled and ideologically amorphous PJ, is less stable than *petismo*, *panismo*, *priísmo*, and *perredismo*.

Moreover, it is a weak programmatic stance, not a changing one, that causes a high rate of instability in partisanship. For example, more than half of PMDB and PSDB partisans defected over the course of 4- to 6-month periods in both 2010 and 2014, periods that were devoid of major brand changes by these two parties.[21] Roughly speaking, there is a ceiling of 75% on the rate of partisan stability regardless of how short the time is between interviews. We know from previous research that partisanship in Brazil does undergo substantive shifts in response to changes in evaluations of ongoing events (Baker et al. 2016), although some of this change is surely due to measurement error (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002).

Our other primary conclusion is a null finding. The evidence provides rather minimal support for the commonly held claim that party and party system age are positively correlated with partisan stability (Converse 1969; Norris 2004). To be sure, partisanship for the aged parties of the U.K. and the U.S. is on average more stable than it is in Latin America's new democracies (with the one exception of partisanship for the Liberal Democratic party, which is even older than the Labour Party). This, however, seems to be unrelated to party age. Most obviously, *perredismo* (founded in 1989) is *not* less stable than *panismo* (1939) or *priísmo* (1929). Moreover, it is a good deal more stable, as is *petismo* (1980), than partisanship for Brazil's oldest party (the PMDB, founded in 1965 although renamed in 1981). Finally, *peronismo* (1947) ranks

[21] To be clear, we do think that brand change speeds up the rate of instability. This is evidenced by the relatively high rate of instability among former *petistas* over the 2002 to 2006 period, a time when the PT moderated its policy stances and became mired in corruption scandals.

as less stable than *petismo* and *perredismo*. The one instance when age mattered is the high rate of instability in partisanship for Argentina's PRO, which was a mere 10 years old at the time. It appears that once parties overcome some minimum age threshold that lies between 10 years and 30 years, the effects of age are negligible. In sum, it is the clarity of a programmatic brand, and not age, that promotes stability of mass partisanship.

Conclusion

How, then, do we answer the question with which we began: Is mass partisanship in Latin America a wholly different animal from mass partisanship in older democracies with more entrenched party systems? Not surprisingly, our answer is "sort of." Mass partisanship is simply not as stable, on average, in Latin America as it is in the older democracies, and this cannot be attributed entirely to the greater frequency of elite-driven brand dilution in the former. There is a higher rate of individual-level partisan churn in Latin America, even for parties that are programmatic and mature. At the same time, declarations of partisanship in our three Latin American countries do have some substance and constancy to them, especially for programmatic parties. Respondents are far more likely than chance to stand by their previously declared partisanship in repeated interviews. Moreover, most individuals (especially in Argentina and Brazil) are exceedingly unlikely to cross party lines, switching between nonpartisanship and partisanship but always for the same party.

Thus, the "Is partisanship identity or evaluation?" question poses a false dichotomy. Both kinds of partisanship and partisans exist, side by side, in the Latin American electorates we analyze. More specifically, we can say that the higher rates of individual-level instability mean that the number of stable "identity partisans" is lower in our three new democracies than in the

two older democracies. At most, between 40% and 70% of declared partisans at any given time fit the partisanship-as-identity mold in Latin America, compared to around 85% in the US and UK.

For this reason, we would urge Latin Americanist scholars to view survey-measured, self-designated groups of (say) *petistas* or *panistas* with fluidity. Not all of the expressed identities and self-categorizations at a given point in time are capturing stable psychological orientations. Only a fraction of self-declared partisans will declare as such a few months later, although, unless a party is in terminal decline, its aggregate ranks will be replenished with new declared partisans. Many of these more flexible individuals fit the partisanship-as-evaluation mold. Although beyond the scope of this chapter, previous work has shown that observed changes through time in mass partisanship are, in part, responses to candidates, economies, party moves in the issue space, and other politically-relevant events (Baker et al. 2016; Lupu 2016b).[22]

We wish to conclude by making it clear that, in comparing partisanship across world regions, it is not our intention to hold up party systems and mass political behavior in Europe and the US as an ideal to which Latin America should strive or be compared in a negative light. Historically, political scientists have considered stable party systems and partisans to be beneficial for democratic citizenship and governance (Schattschneider 1942), and the newer literature on Latin America's young democracies is no exception (Mainwaring 1999; Vidal et al. 2010):

> When citizens lack firm, enduring dispositions to guide their thinking about politics, it is difficult for them to hold leaders accountable or to offer much guidance about policy. … If partisan attachments are only loosely held … the

[22] Some of these movements through time are also measurement error. This distinction—between measurement error and genuine responses to events—lies at the core of the debate between the identity and evaluation schools (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002). Fully resolving this is beyond the scope of this chapter, but, again, previous evidence does indicate that at least some of this individual-level change is genuine signal—that is, people responding to events.

> quality of democratic governance is likely to suffer (McCann and Lawson 2003: 60-61, 64).

Yet partisans are also just that … partisan. They are more biased, opinionated, and intolerant of opposing views. Partisans process political events and information through a biased lens, and ultimately contribute to or even create political polarization:

> [P]artisanship is the antithesis of open-mindedness and tolerance. Partisans have already decided who is right and who is wrong, and thus they are unlikely to be objective judges of political information. Instead, their perceptual biases reinforce and perpetuate strong differences of opinion between [parties] (Mutz 2006: 128).

Research from the U.S. suggests that it is independents and weak partisans who maximize elite accountability, precisely because they, unlike partisans, respond to how elites perform in office (Lavine, Johnston, and Steenbergen 2012; Zaller 2004). In sum, we compare partisanship in Latin America to that in developed-country democracies largely because much is known about and data are available on the latter. We defer judgments about the impact of partisan stability on democratic quality and governance to empirical studies that directly assess it.

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